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Abstract 
Existing concepts can be a major barrier to learning new counterintuitive concepts 
that contradict pre-existing experience-based beliefs or misleading perceptual cues. When 
reasoning about counterintuitive concepts, inhibitory control is thought to enable the 
suppression of incorrect concepts. This study investigated the association between inhibitory 
control and counterintuitive science and maths reasoning in adolescents (N=90, 11-15 years). 
Both response and semantic inhibition were associated with counterintuitive science and 
maths reasoning, when controlling for age, general cognitive ability, and performance in 
control science and maths trials. Better response inhibition was associated with longer 
reaction times in counterintuitive trials, while better semantic inhibition was associated with 
higher accuracy in counterintuitive trials. This novel finding suggests that different aspects of 
inhibitory control may offer unique contributions to counterintuitive reasoning during 
adolescence and provides further support for the hypothesis that inhibitory control plays a 
role in science and maths reasoning. 
 
Introduction 
The acquisition of abstract concepts reflecting an understanding of how elements in 
the world relate to one another underpins school-based learning of science and maths [1]. 
These abstract concepts go beyond what is immediately perceptually available, and 
sometimes go against prior experience, beliefs or perceptual evidence. Learning new 
concepts is therefore constrained by pupils’ ability to overcome conflicting information. 
Conceptual change, the process of acquiring a new explanatory framework for a certain 
phenomenon, has been argued to be a key challenge faced by science educators [2], requiring 
more than learning new facts and going beyond the enrichment of previously held notions 
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[3]. Similarly, in maths, when learning and applying new concepts, pupils can be misled by 
prior beliefs, generalisation of previous learning (e.g. in the case where for integers 5 > 2 
while for fractions 1/5 < 1/2) [4] or perceptual evidence (e.g. when a larger surface area may 
not be associated with a larger perimeter, see Fig 1b) [5-7]. While students used to be thought 
to learn new concepts through the replacement, reorganisation, or restructuring of previously 
held concepts [3,8], newer research suggests that prior beliefs remain in the face of new 
evidence and can lead to science and maths misconceptions that are notoriously resistant to 
change, persisting throughout school education and well into adulthood [1,6,9,10]. For 
example, a study with adults educated in science found that accuracy was lower and response 
times longer in statements where naïve and scientific theories were inconsistent (i.e. 
counterintuitive), compared to statements consistent across naïve and scientific theories (i.e. 
intuitive) [11]. This is evidence of an ongoing requirement to suppress intuitive responses 
even when the correct answer has been learnt. 
Inhibitory control, the ability to suppress a prepotent response or irrelevant 
information, is thought to allow the suppression of naïve theories, incorrect strategies, or 
misleading perceptual cues during counterintuitive reasoning in science and maths [1,12-17]. 
A better understanding of the learning of science and maths is particularly important, as these 
disciplines are of enormous economic impact, are compulsory subjects in primary and 
secondary school, and are considered particularly difficult subjects to learn [18,19].  
Most previous research exploring the cognitive processes behind science and maths 
misconceptions has been performed on children [12,16,19-21] or adults [13,14,17]. The 
current study investigated the role of inhibitory control in counterintuitive reasoning, i.e. 
reasoning about concepts where a misconception may be held, during adolescence, a period 
when inhibitory control continues to develop [22] and individuals learn increasingly 
advanced concepts in both science and maths [23,24]. 
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Inhibitory control has been classified in various ways. Nigg [25], for example, 
outlined eight kinds of inhibition, while others tend to group inhibitory control into two 
categories [26]. Behavioural, or response inhibition, is the suppression of a motor response, 
whereas interference control, or semantic inhibition, is the suppression of meaning in the face 
of conflict. In a simple Go/No-Go response inhibition task, rapid frequent responses are made 
to Go stimuli, with infrequent non-responses to No-Go stimuli [27]. Errors of commission 
occur when the dominant Go response has not been successfully inhibited in a No-Go trial. In 
a complex version, No-Go events are determined by both the current and previous trial [27]. 
As the complex Go/No-Go requires participants to keep the current and previous trial in mind 
to perform accurately, it provides a measure of inhibitory control in the context of a cognitive 
load. In a Stroop semantic inhibition task, conflicting information is presented simultaneously 
and the less salient aspect of the stimulus is responded to while the dominant aspect is 
inhibited [28]. The Stroop therefore requires the suppression of one type of meaning 
alongside the processing of another. Performance on the simple Go/No-Go [29,30], complex 
Go/No-Go [29], and Stroop [22,31] tends to improve through adolescence. Attempts to 
establish the extent of overlap between response and semantic inhibition have yielded mixed 
results [32,33], indicating that measures of inhibition are influenced by different underlying 
mechanisms [34], but are not totally independent [26]. With this in mind, the current study 
measured both response and semantic inhibition, in order to establish the individual roles that 
each might play in counterintuitive reasoning. 
  The link between science and maths reasoning in general, or counterintuitive 
reasoning specifically, and inhibitory control has been examined across development using 
correlational, priming, and neuroimaging studies. Evidence from correlational studies 
suggests that children with better inhibitory control perform better on science problems 
requiring counterintuitive reasoning. In the domain of physics, the tubes task had an 
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experimenter drop a ball down one of three opaque tubes that crossed over [35]. Three- and 
four-year-olds were asked to point to the opaque container where the ball landed. The most 
common error was to choose the container directly beneath the opening of the tube, 
suggesting that the toddlers’ gravity theory (that the ball would fall in a straight trajectory) 
was not successfully inhibited in favour of an object solidity theory (that the ball would 
follow the solid tube). Since looking time paradigms reveal an understanding of object 
solidity at this age [36], the authors argued that the task engaged a number of strategies, and 
that selection of the correct strategy depended on the inhibition of incorrect strategies. This 
interpretation was further supported by a positive correlation between tubes task performance 
and inhibitory control as measured by a gift delay task [35]. In biology, mature biological 
understandings of life, death, and bodily functions were predicted in five- to seven-year-olds 
by an aggregate measure of executive function that reflected performance on tasks requiring a 
combination of shifting, working memory, and either response inhibition or semantic 
inhibition [19]. Although the executive function measure was not purely inhibitory control, 
the authors suggested that inhibitory control is one skill that enabled the suppression of naïve 
biological theories when a mature conceptual understanding was shown. The picture is, 
however, inconsistent, as inhibitory control was not related to science performance in other 
studies in 11-year-olds [37] or 12- to 13-year-olds [38,39]. 
In the domain of maths, overlapping strategy use in problem solving is a particular 
demonstration of the maintenance of multiple concepts and theories over the course of 
learning, rather than the replacement of old concepts by new concepts. An examination of 
strategy use in four- and five-year-olds solving maths sums found that even when new, more 
sophisticated strategies had been learnt, children continued to use old strategies [40,41]. The 
concurrent existence of multiple strategies suggests that inhibitory control is likely to be 
involved from a young age to allow selection of the best strategy through suppression of the 
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alternatives. When inhibitory control was measured directly through a Stroop task, 
performance in three- to six-year-olds was associated with scores on a standardised maths test 
in one experiment, and with magnitude comparison in another [21]. Similarly, a study of 11- 
to 14-year-olds found that maths achievement was correlated with both numerical and non-
numerical semantic inhibitory control [20]. A further maths study investigated inhibitory 
control in 14-year-olds who were instructed to use a new strategy for solving algebra word 
problems [42]. Better response and semantic inhibitory control predicted higher accuracy as 
well as fewer intrusions of the previous strategy [42], indicating that inhibitory control 
suppressed the previous strategy in effective maths reasoning. As with science, inhibitory 
control does not always relate to school performance, as evidenced by one study where 5- to 
6-year-olds’ inhibition did not predict maths achievement [43]. A meta-analysis showed a 
modest overall association between inhibitory control and maths in young children [44]. 
These studies investigated overall associations between inhibitory control and general maths 
performance, but did not specifically focus on counterintuitive reasoning. 
A few studies have used priming to probe the role of inhibitory control in 
counterintuitive maths reasoning. Nine-year-olds performed better on a counterintuitive 
number conservation trial if they were primed to inhibit through the successful inhibition of 
an incongruent Stroop trial [45]. Ten-year-olds performed better on a number conservation or 
class inclusion task when primed by a trial from the other task requiring the inhibition of a 
misleading strategy [12]. In a further study spanning three age groups, children (~ 12 years 
old), adolescents (~ 15 years old) and adults showed slower response times when a probe 
problem with congruent relational term and arithmetic operation (“more than” > addition) 
followed a prime problem with incongruent relational term and arithmetic operation (“more 
than” > subtraction). This negative priming was interpreted as reflecting that successfully 
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solving these arithmetic counterintuitive problems required the inhibition of an incorrect 
strategy [16]. 
Neuroimaging work on logical and scientific reasoning in adults has consistently 
shown that the inhibition of pre-existing beliefs, misleading perceptual-biases, and intuitive 
heuristics during counterintuitive reasoning is associated with the activation of the anterior 
cingulate cortex and the prefrontal cortex, notably the inferior frontal cortex and dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, thought to reflect the recruitment of greater cognitive control for 
counterintutive vs. intuitive reasoning [12,14,17,46-49]. Further consistent evidence comes 
from Houdé and colleagues [50], who attempted to shift adult’s responses from a perceptual 
bias to logical reasoning in a rule falsification task and showed that this shift was associated 
with increased recruitment of prefrontal, versus posterior, brain regions, which was 
interpreted as reflecting their inhibition of a misleading strategy.  
The research summarised above suggests that naïve theories, prior knowledge, and 
misleading perceptual cues are inhibited during successful science and maths reasoning. 
Adolescents are faced with increasingly complex, and sometimes counterintuitive, science 
and maths concepts through compulsory school curricula, while their inhibitory control 
abilities are still developing. The current study aimed to investigate the association between 
inhibitory control and counterintuitive science and maths reasoning in 11- to 15-year-olds.  
A novel science and maths misconceptions task was designed to measure adolescents’ 
ability to give the correct (although counterintuitive) answer when faced with problems 
known to be associated with misconceptions. Only misconceptions relevant to the curriculum 
for 11- to 14-year-olds (Key Stage 3 for England) were included, based on consultation with 
curricula [23,24] and student study guides [51,52] to ensure validity. While previous studies 
focused on just one or two misconceptions [13,17,49], the aim here was to cover a wide range 
of topics to increase the relevance of our findings to education. Control science and maths 
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problems that did not require counterintuitive reasoning (but were related to the 
counterintuitive concepts) were also included, to account for discipline-specific factors such 
as knowledge and interest in science and maths, however our predictions and analyses 
focused on the importance of inhibitory control for counterintuitive reasoning specifically, 
rather than for science and maths achievement in general (e.g. [20]). The youngest 
participants were at the start of the Key Stage 3 curriculum in England (and the start of 
secondary school), and the oldest had completed the Key Stage 3 curriculum, allowing the 
inclusion of the same problems for all participants. 
Both response and semantic inhibition were measured to investigate the possible 
unique influence of these aspects of inhibitory control. Response inhibition was measured 
using a simple and complex Go/No-Go adapted from Watanabe et al. [53], to investigate the 
possibility that response inhibition in the context of higher cognitive load, namely a 1-back 
working memory load, would be more associated with complex science and maths reasoning, 
where information may need to be maintained and manipulated while the answer is worked 
out, compared to inhibitory control within a simpler task. Previous research has shown that 
simple and complex Go/No-Go tasks are associated with different brain networks [27]. 
Semantic inhibition was measured with a numerical Stroop adapted from Khng and Lee [34]. 
It was hypothesised that better semantic inhibitory control, evidenced by less 
interference effect on accuracy and reaction time (RT) in the numerical Stroop task, would 
allow participants to better solve the conflict between their naïve belief or misleading 
perceptual information and the correct answer, and that they would therefore show more 
accurate and faster responses on the science and maths misconception problems, relative to 
non-counterintuitive control problems. It was also hypothesised that better response 
inhibition, evidenced by higher accuracy in simple and complex No-Go trials, would also be 
associated with better science and maths misconception performance, by limiting impulsive 
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responses. As science and maths problem solving typically requires the maintenance of some 
information in working memory, and as misconceptions in particular may elicit competition 
between, and comparison of, intuitive and counterintuitive responses, it was finally 
hypothesised that performance in complex No-Go trials would show a greater association 
with science and maths misconception performance than performance in simple No-Go trials.   
 
Methods 
This project received approval from the Department of Psychological Sciences Ethics 
Committee, Birkbeck College University of London [reference approval number: 141552]. 
 
Participants 
Ninety pupils with no neurological or developmental disorders, from an English 
secondary school where most students are from minority ethnic heritages, and the proportion 
of free school meals (determined by parental income-related benefits) is well above average, 
took part (Table 1). Letters were sent to parents of 11- to 15-year-olds (in Years 7 to 10), 
inviting their children to take part. Written informed parental consent was obtained, where 
parents confirmed that their children had no neurological or developmental disorders. 
Participants aged 11 or 12 years verbally consented, while 13- to 15-year-olds provided 
written consent, in accordance with the guidelines of the local ethics committee, which 
approved the study. 
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Table 1. Participant Characteristics. 
     
WASI Vocabulary WASI Matrix Reasoning 
  
 
Age (years) 
Girls: 
Boys Raw scores 
Standardised 
scores Raw scores 
Standardised 
scores 
Age 
group n M (SD) Range n M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
12y 25 12.14 (0.30) 11.75 – 12.67 13:12 33.01 (3.51) 105.82 (8.63) 19.00 (3.46) 103.54 (13.28) 
13y 25 13.26 (0.31) 12.75 – 13.75 17:8 33.12 (3.69) 102.16 (9.87) 18.12 (3.14) 97.45 (10.41) 
14y 21 14.32 (0.29) 13.92 – 14.75 9:12 33.71 (5.02) 100.65 (12.08) 19.67 (2.92) 101.22 (11.14) 
15y 19 15.21 (0.35) 14.75 – 15.75 12:7 35.26 (3.21) 101.43 (7.94) 18.32 (4.06) 95.19 (13.27) 
Age groups did not differ in raw Vocabulary scores, p = .238, raw Matrix Reasoning scores, 
p = .423, or gender distribution, p = .332. 
 
Tasks 
Science and maths misconceptions 
The science and maths misconceptions task was administered on a laptop. On each 
trial, participants read a statement relating to science or maths, and pressed one of two keys to 
indicate whether they thought the statement was correct or incorrect. There were 48 problem-
sets, each addressing one curriculum-related misconception where the intuitive response is 
incorrect, based on research findings (e.g. [6,7,54]). 
Each problem-set contained four problems (Fig 1). A Misconception-False problem 
presented a false statement based on a counterintuitive concept, while a Misconception-True 
problem presented a true statement based on the same counterintuitive concept. All 
misconception problems required counterintuitive reasoning; the intuitive response was 
incorrect. Varying the nature of the statements was necessary to counterbalance left/right 
answers across the experiment: Including Misconception-False problems only would have led 
to the correct answer being “Incorrect” on all trials. Note that it was expected that accuracy 
and RT might be influenced by true or false statement type, since it might be easier to give a 
correct response when the statement is true. 
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Fig 1. Example Problem-Sets for (a) Science and (b) Maths. Text and image size has been 
increased to enhance legibility. Correct and incorrect ‘buttons’ remained on the screen to 
remind participants which key to press.  
 
Knowledge and interest in the topic and task-general factors such as processing speed 
and attention, were controlled for with problems where no misconception was expected 
(Control-False, Control-True) (Fig 1). Efforts were made to ensure that misconception and 
control problems were matched on statement length, positive versus negative wording, and 
terminology. It was anticipated that RTs would be faster and accuracy higher in control trials 
(where counterintuitive reasoning is not required) compared to misconception trials. 
Fig 1 presents two examples of problem-sets. The science problem-set (Fig 1a) refers 
to the misconception that heavy objects fall faster than lighter objects. To correctly solve the 
Misconception problems, participants need to inhibit their naïve belief that the weight of 
objects matters in this situation. The Control problems also refer to the fall of objects, but in 
this case the concept is that objects fall to the ground if they are not supported. As this is not 
a misconception participants do not have to inhibit a prior belief. The maths problem-set (Fig 
1b) refers to the misconception that a shape with a larger area will also have a larger 
perimeter. To answer correctly on Misconception trials, participants need to inhibit their 
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perception of the larger area of the purple figure compared to the orange figure, which is 
misleading and irrelevant, and instead focus on assessing the perimeter of the two shapes. 
The Control problems also ask about perimeters but in this case the area and perimeters of the 
shapes are consistent, therefore there is no misleading perceptual information to inhibit to 
obtain the correct answer. It was expected that participants with better inhibitory control 
would be able to answer Misconception problems more quickly (as the incorrect belief or 
irrelevant perceptual information is more quickly inhibited) and accurately (as the correct 
belief or correct perceptual information is eventually selected) than those with poorer 
inhibitory control, who might answer intuitively, or take longer to inhibit the incorrect belief 
or irrelevant perceptual information.   
Twenty-six problem-sets were science-based. Biology topics included living 
organisms, cells, inheritance, genetics, and plants (8 problem-sets). Chemistry topics included 
pollution, atoms, pure and impure substances, heating, and melting (7 problem-sets). Physics 
topics included force, the solar system, electricity, gravity, waves, and temperature (11 
problem-sets). Maths topics included fractions, decimals, angles, algebra, shape, 
transformations, statistics, probability, and graphs (22 problem-sets). One hundred and 
twenty-six problems were accompanied by images (biology: 28/32; chemistry: 18/28; 
physics: 36/44; maths: 44/88) that were sometimes essential for the problem, sometimes 
provided further explanation, and sometimes simply relevant to keep the task engaging. In all 
cases the Misconception-True/False and Control-True/False problems were matched as well 
as possible in terms of text and images presented, ensuring all participants saw similar stimuli 
across conditions, and allowing the comparison of participants’ performance across 
conditions. See S1 Fig for more example problem-sets. 
Two sequences of 96 trials were created by distributing problems such that each 
sequence contained one misconception trial and one control trial from each problem-set. Two 
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further sequences were created by reversing the presentation order of the original sequences. 
Each participant thus completed 24 of each of the four problem-set types (Misconception-
False, Misconception-True, Control-False, Control-True). Participants were assigned to a 
sequence pseudo-randomly, ensuring each age group contained the range of sequences. 
Stimuli remained on the screen until a response was made, and the task lasted 11 min on 
average including self-timed breaks every 24 trials. Accuracy and RT were recorded. 
 
Inhibitory control 
Simple and complex versions of a Go/No-Go task, measuring response inhibition, and 
a numerical Stroop task, measuring semantic inhibition, were administered on a laptop (Fig 
2). See S1 File for full details of these tasks.  
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Fig 2. Example Time Course of Events in the Inhibitory Control Tasks. (a) In the simple 
Go/No-Go, participants pressed the left or right key to indicate the location of the green 
square (Go trials), but withheld their response when the square was red (No-Go trials). (b) In 
the complex Go/No-Go, participants pressed the left or right key to indicate the location of 
the coloured square (Go trials), but withheld their response when a blue square followed a 
yellow square (No-Go trials). In both tasks 25% of trials were No-Go, as in previous studies 
(e.g. [29]), so that non-responses were infrequent and thus harder to inhibit, and the inter-
stimulus interval was jittered between 600 and 800 ms. (c) In the numerical Stroop, 
participants pressed the key corresponding to the number of digits on the screen. On 
congruent trials, the number of digits and the digits themselves matched, while on 
incongruent trials they differed and participants had to inhibit the representation of the digits. 
Fifty percent of trials were incongruent as in prior tests of semantic inhibition (e.g. [21]) to 
maintain high levels of conflict and allow accuracy and RT comparisons between trial types. 
Stimuli remained on the screen until the participant responded or for a maximum of 1500 ms. 
 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) 
The Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning subtests of the WASI-II [55] were 
administered using the stimulus book to control for the contribution of general cognitive 
ability to science and maths performance (Table 1). The Vocabulary subtest requires 
participants to explain the meaning of words, while the Matrix Reasoning subtest requires 
participants to choose a picture that completes a pattern. 
 
Procedure 
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Participants were tested in a quiet space in school for approximately 45 min during 
the school day. The experimenter described each computerised task, emphasising that 
responses should be given as quickly and accurately as possible. The tasks were performed in 
the following order: simple Go/No-Go, complex Go/No-Go, numerical Stroop, science and 
maths misconceptions, WASI Vocabulary, and WASI Matrix Reasoning. Two experimenters 
collected the data, testing 74 and 16 participants respectively. Participants were given no 
results and no rewards for taking part, and it was explained that their responses would remain 
anonymous and independent of school assessments. 
 
Statistical analysis 
Mean RTs are reported for all trials in the science and maths misconceptions task, 
since RTs for incorrect trials are of interest here, reflecting the time spent to reason about a 
counterintuitive concept, even if the resulting answer is incorrect. Mean RTs are reported for 
correct trials only in the inhibitory control tasks (RTs for correct Go trials only in the Go/No-
Go). Examination of boxplots across tasks showed outliers, so exclusionary criteria were put 
in place before analysis commenced. Participants whose mean accuracy or RT was further 
than ±3.29 standard deviations away from the group mean were excluded from analyses of 
the task on which they were an outlier, as standardised scores outside that range are cause for 
concern [56]. Effect sizes are reported as partial eta squared (ηp
2
). For simplicity of reporting, 
age groups are referred to according to the mean age of the group (for example, 12y refers to 
12-year-olds, the Year 7 participants whose ages ranged between 11.75 and 12.67). Main 
effects of Age group were followed up with three planned tests assessing differences between 
12y and 15y, 13y and 15y, and 14y and 15y, since the greatest differences were anticipated in 
comparison to the oldest group.  
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In the science and maths misconceptions task, three participants were excluded due to 
low accuracy (one 13y) or slow RT (one 12y, one 13y), leaving a final N=87 participants. 
Two (Trial type: control, misconception) x two (Discipline: science, maths) x two (Statement 
type: true, false) x four (Age group: 12y, 13y, 14y, 15y) mixed model repeated measures 
ANOVAs were performed on accuracy and RT. Three participants were excluded from the 
simple Go/No-Go task, and two participants were excluded from the complex Go/No-Go 
tasks (see S1 File). Analyses of age effects in the three tasks are reported in S1 File. 
Participants excluded from any individual task analysis were also excluded from the 
regression analyses (final ns: 12y: n=20, 13y: n=22, 14y: n=21, 15y: n=18), leaving a total 
N=81. Correlations were run between the variables of interest to examine collinearity and 
assess associations between measures across the whole sample. Hierarchical multiple 
regressions investigated whether inhibitory control variables could account for individual 
differences in science and maths misconception accuracy and RT.  
Regression models added the control variables using the enter function in block 1: age 
in months, WASI Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning raw scores, and science and maths 
control performance. These variables were expected to have an influence on the outcome 
measure, but were not the primary predictive variables of interest. Raw WASI scores were 
entered rather than standardised scores so that scores were directly comparable across ages. 
Go/No-Go variables were entered stepwise in block 2: simple No-Go accuracy, complex No-
Go accuracy, simple Go accuracy, complex Go accuracy, simple Go RT, complex Go RT. 
Stroop variables were entered stepwise in block 3: accuracy cost (congruent minus 
incongruent), RT cost (incongruent minus congruent), congruent accuracy, and congruent 
RT.  
Inclusion of separate Go/No-Go and Stroop blocks allowed for investigation of 
variance explained individually by response and semantic inhibition. Stepwise entry and the 
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inclusion of variables that do not necessarily reflect inhibition (such as Go accuracy or 
congruent Stroop RT) enabled examination of the possibility that general processing speed or 
accuracy alone were the most important predictors of performance, rather than inhibition per 
se. 
Follow up exploratory regressions were run on science and maths separately, to 
examine possible discipline-specific effects and to explore whether directions of association 
were consistent. All follow up models included the control variables and the inhibitory 
control variables identified in the science and maths combined regressions, using the enter 
method. 
 
Results 
Science and maths misconceptions 
In line with the design of this task, participants tended to give the correct answer in 
control trials, with a mean accuracy of 82.2% (Table 2), while they made more errors on 
misconception trials, where the mean accuracy was 54.7%. While this is close to chance 
performance (50%), S2 Fig shows a histogram of mean accuracy in each of the 96 science 
and maths misconception trials demonstrating that participants answered correctly more often 
on some trials than others. This indicates that the accuracy in misconception trials is not 
attributable to chance performance (guesses) on all problems.  
A two (Trial type: control, misconception) x two (Discipline: science, maths) x two 
(Statement type: true, false) x four (Age group: 12y, 13y, 14y, 15y) mixed model repeated 
measures ANOVA performed on accuracy showed main effects of Trial type and Statement 
type, with greater accuracy in control compared to misconception trials, and true compared to 
false statements (Table 2). There was no main effect of Discipline. 
INHIBITORY CONTROL AND SCIENCE AND MATHS REASONING 18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Accuracy and RT Estimated Marginal Means in the Science and Maths 
Misconceptions Task. 
 
 Accuracy (%) RT (ms) 
 
 M (SE) M (SE) 
Main effects    
Trial type  
F(1, 83) = 816.73,  
p < .001, ηp
2
 = .908 
F(1, 83) = 310.32,  
p < .001, ηp
2
 = .789 
 Control  82.2 (0.8) 5156 (134) 
 Misconception  54.7 (0.9) 6683 (190) 
Discipline  n.s., p = .367 
F(1, 83) = 55.73,  
p < .001, ηp
2
 = .402 
 Science  68.1 (0.9) 5598 (147) 
 Maths  68.9 (0.7) 6240 (180) 
Statement type  
F(1, 83) = 38.64,  
p < .001, ηp
2
 = .318 
F(1, 83) = 5.26,  
p = .024, ηp
2
 = .060 
 True  72.5 (0.8) 5837 (158) 
 False  64.4 (1.1) 6002 (168) 
Age group  
F(3, 83) = 5.61,  
p = .001, ηp
2
 = .169 
n.s., p = .631 
 12y  65.3 (1.3) 6149 (301) 
 13y  66.5 (1.3) 5856 (307) 
 14y  69.2 (1.4) 6073 (322) 
 15y  72.8 (1.5) 5601 (338) 
Interaction effects    
Trial type Statement type 
F(1, 83) = 11.48,  
p = .001, ηp
2
 = .121 
n.s., p = .076 
 Control  True 84.8 (0.9) 4986 (136) 
  False 79.6 (1.1) 5327 (153) 
 Misconception  True 60.2 (1.1) 6688 (199) 
 
 False 49.3 (1.4) 6678 (204) 
Discipline Statement type 
F(1, 83) = 67.73,  
p < .001, ηp
2
 = .449 
F(1, 83) = 14.15,  
p < .001, ηp
2
 = .146 
 Science  True 75.8 (1.1) 5406 (146) 
  False 60.3 (1.4) 5791 (159) 
 Maths  True 69.3 (0.9) 6268 (181) 
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  False 68.5 (1.1) 6214 (193) 
 
 
These main effects were modulated by a significant interaction between Trial type and 
Statement type (Table 2), which was followed up with two repeated measures ANOVAs on 
control and misconception accuracy. The interaction was attributable to less difference in 
accuracy between true and false statements in control trials, F(1,83) = 11.33,  p = .001, ηp
2
 = 
.120, compared to misconception trials, F(1,83) = 28.57,  p < .001, ηp
2
 = .256. There was an 
additional significant interaction between Discipline and Statement type, whereby the 
difference between true and false statements was significant for science trials, F(1,83) = 
84.75, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .505, but not maths trials, p = .629 (Table 2). Accuracy increased with 
age and the pattern of age increase differed between science and maths (see S1 File for a 
description of Age group effects on accuracy).  
The same ANOVA was performed on RT. There were main effects of Trial type, 
Discipline, and Statement type, with longer RTs in maths compared to science, 
misconception compared to control trials, and false compared to true trials (Table 2). There 
was no main effect of Age group on RT. As for accuracy, there was a significant interaction 
between Discipline and Statement type, which was followed up with two further repeated 
measures ANOVAs. There was a significant difference between true and false statements for 
science, F(1,83) = 20.50, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .198, with longer RTs for false trials (Table 2), while 
there was no significant difference between true and false trials for maths, p = .589. No other 
interaction was significant, p’s > .1. 
In summary, the main finding of interest was lower accuracy and longer RTs in 
misconception compared to control trials. This is consistent with the hypothesis and design of 
the paradigm, since it was anticipated that intuitive responses would be incorrect and 
reasoning would take longer in misconception trials. Lower accuracy and longer RTs were 
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also found for false statements compared to true statements in science, but not maths. Maths 
RTs were longer than science RTs overall. Finally, improved performance with age was 
reflected in accuracy only and more prolonged in science than maths.  
 
Inhibitory control 
The results of the inhibitory control tasks are summarised in Table 3 and detailed in 
S1 File. Briefly, participants showed the expected poorer performance in No-Go trials of the 
Go/No-Go tasks and in incongruent trials of the numerical Stroop, reflecting the inhibitory 
control demands of these trials. 
 
Table 3. Accuracy and RT Estimated Marginal Means in the Inhibitory Control Tasks. 
 
Simple  
Go/No-Go 
Complex  
Go/No-Go 
Numerical  
Stroop 
 
M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) 
Accuracy (%)    
Trial type    
 Go/Congruent 96.4 (0.4) 84.5 (1.0) 96.1 (0.4) 
 No-Go/Incongruent 84.7 (1.3) 53.6 (2.0) 80.1 (1.2) 
Age group    
 12y 86.7 (1.4) 69.2 (2.2) 84.3 (1.3) 
 13y 91.5 (1.4) 67.7 (2.1) 89.2 (1.3) 
 14y 92.4 (1.5) 68.2 (2.3) 89.5 (1.4) 
 15y 91.4 (1.6) 71.3 (2.5) 89.4 (1.5) 
RT (ms)      
Trial type    
 Go/Congruent 346 (3) 400 (6) 671 (9) 
 No-Go/Incongruent 
a
 
a
 779 (11) 
Age group    
 12y 354 (7) 400 (11) 745 (18) 
 13y 353 (7) 399 (10) 752 (19) 
 14y 348 (7) 413 (11) 700 (20) 
 15y 330 (7) 388 (12) 703 (21) 
a
 RTs are for correct trials only, therefore there are no RTs for No-Go trials. 
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Regression analyses 
Correlations between the variables of interest were examined (Table B in S1 File) and 
assumptions regarding multicollinearity were met. An initial hierarchical multiple regression 
(Table 4) investigated whether inhibitory control measures could account for variance in 
science and maths misconception accuracy. The first model (1a) with age, WASI Vocabulary 
and Matrix Reasoning raw scores, and science and maths control accuracy as predictors, was 
significant, explaining 26% of the variance. Age and science and maths control accuracy 
were significant predictors of misconception accuracy. Stroop RT cost was selected using a 
stepwise approach in model 1b, uniquely accounting for 5% of the variance. Greater Stroop 
RT cost was associated with lower misconception accuracy. No Go/No-Go variables were 
selected by the model. 
The second regression investigated misconception RT. The first model (2a) with age, 
WASI Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning raw scores, and science and maths control RT as 
predictors, was significant, explaining 84% of the variance. Only science and maths control 
RT was a significant predictor of misconception accuracy. Complex No-Go accuracy was 
selected in model 2b, uniquely accounting for 1% of the variance. Greater complex No-Go 
accuracy was associated with higher misconception RT. No Stroop variables were selected by 
the model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INHIBITORY CONTROL AND SCIENCE AND MATHS REASONING 22 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Regression Models for Science and Maths Combined. 
  Variables β t p 
DV: Science and maths misconception accuracy 
Model 1a Constant 
 
-0.62 .535 
F(4, 76) = 6.61, 
p < .001, R
2
 = 26% 
Age (months) .29 2.83 .006 
WASI Vocabulary raw .10 0.85 .397 
 
WASI Matrix Reasoning raw .09 0.87 .389 
 
Science and maths control accuracy .26 2.22  .029 
Model 1b Constant   -0.24 .812 
F(5, 75) = 6.68, 
p < .001, R
2
 = 31%, 
ΔR2 = 5.0% 
Age (months) .30 3.02 .004 
WASI Vocabulary raw .08 0.71 .482 
WASI Matrix Reasoning raw .09 0.87 .389 
 
Science and maths control accuracy .26 2.28 .026 
  Stroop RT cost -.22 -2.33 .023 
DV: Science and maths misconception RT 
Model 2a Constant  -1.37 .174 
F(4, 76) = 101.52, 
p < .001, R
2
 = 84% 
Age (months) -.01 -0.23 .819 
WASI Vocabulary raw .09 1.89 .063 
 WASI Matrix Reasoning raw .07 1.46 .148 
  Science and maths control RT .911 19.61 < .001 
Model 2b Constant  -1.73 .088 
F(5, 75) = 86.61, 
 p < .001, R
2
 = 85%, 
ΔR2 = 1.0% 
Age (months) -.01 -0.12 .908 
WASI Vocabulary raw .08 1.66 .101 
WASI Matrix Reasoning raw .07 1.48 .143 
  Science and maths control RT .91 20.05 < .001 
 
Complex No-Go accuracy .10 2.26 .027 
Significant predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. DV = dependent variable; β = 
standardised coefficients. 
 
Follow up exploratory regressions (Table 5) examined the extent to which these 
associations held for science and maths individually, adding the inhibitory control variables 
with the enter method. Stroop RT cost was not a significant predictor of science (model 3) or 
maths (model 4) misconception accuracy, although the p-values were at trend and the 
coefficients were in the same direction as the combined analyses. Complex Go/No-Go 
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accuracy was not a significant predictor of science (model 5) or maths (model 6) 
misconception RT. This time the coefficient was positive for maths, as with the combined 
analyses, but negative for science. 
 
Table 5. Regression Models for Science and Maths Separately. 
  Variables β t p 
DV: Science misconception accuracy 
Model 3 Constant  -0.21 .904 
F(5, 75) = 4.21, 
p = .002, R
2
 = 22% 
Age (months) .21 2.00 .049 
WASI Vocabulary raw -.02 -0.19 .849 
 
WASI Matrix Reasoning raw .00 .00 .999 
  Science control accuracy .35 2.98 .004 
 Stroop RT cost -.18 -1.77 .080 
DV: Maths misconception accuracy 
Model 4 Constant  .049 .961 
F(5, 75) = 3.98, 
p < .003, R
2
 = 21% 
Age (months) .27 2.52 .014 
WASI Vocabulary raw .15 1.30 .199 
 
WASI Matrix Reasoning raw .15 1.42 .160 
  Maths control accuracy .09 .76 .452 
 Stroop RT cost -.18 -1.76 .083 
DV: Science misconception RT 
Model 5 Constant  -0.11 .915 
F(5, 75) = 32.84, 
p < .001, R
2
 = 69% 
Age (months) .08 1.28 .203 
WASI Vocabulary raw .03 0.37 .711 
 
WASI Matrix Reasoning raw .01 0.14 .890 
 
Science control RT .84 12.43 < .001 
 Complex No-Go accuracy -.10 -1.55 .124 
DV: Maths misconception RT 
Model 6 Constant  -.79 .43 
F(5, 75) = 43.02, 
p < .001, R
2
 = 74% 
Age (months) -.08 -1.31 .195 
WASI Vocabulary raw .11 1.78 .079 
 
WASI Matrix Reasoning raw .11 1.86 .067 
 
Maths control RT .83 13.96 < .001 
 Complex No-Go accuracy .063 1.05 .296 
Significant predictors (p < .05) are highlighted in bold. DV = dependent variable; β = 
standardised coefficients. 
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In summary, the regression analyses revealed unique roles for response and semantic 
inhibition in reasoning about science and maths misconceptions. Both response inhibition 
(complex No-Go accuracy) and semantic inhibition (Stroop RT cost) were predictors of 
performance when science and maths misconceptions were combined. Proficiency in 
semantic inhibition was more important for predicting misconception accuracy, while 
proficient response inhibition was more important for predicting longer RTs when addressing 
misconception problems.  
 
Discussion 
The current study investigated the role of inhibitory control in counterintuitive science 
and maths reasoning in adolescence. It was hypothesised that better inhibitory control would 
be associated with better performance in science and maths misconception problems, when 
controlling for performance on related problems, age, and general cognitive ability. Ninety 
adolescents were tested on response and semantic inhibition and a novel science and maths 
misconceptions task. Both response and semantic inhibition were associated with 
performance in science and maths misconception trials, beyond performance in control trials 
and individual differences in general cognitive ability or age. This was the first study to 
consider the unique roles of response and semantic inhibition in this context, demonstrating 
that response inhibition may be more related to RTs in counterintuitive reasoning, while 
semantic inhibition may be more related to accuracy. General performance on the science and 
maths misconceptions task will be considered first, followed by inhibitory control findings; 
finally the association between inhibitory control and science and maths misconception 
performance will be discussed.  
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Science and maths misconceptions 
As anticipated, accuracy was lower and RTs slower for misconception trials, 
indicating that reasoning about counterintuitive curriculum-related concepts leads to 
misconceptions in this age group, even in the oldest participants who should have a good 
understanding of these concepts having covered them all at school. Only small age effects 
were observed, in line with standardised assessment findings that only small improvements 
are made in maths within this age range [6]. 
The reduction in accuracy in false trials compared to true trials was greater for 
misconception than control trials, which may be due to increased cognitive demand in false 
trials. To arrive at the correct response, the participant must first read the statement and detect 
an error, then possibly generate the true statement internally before deciding that the 
statement presented is false. This may explain why it is easier to answer a true statement 
correctly, especially if it is counterintuitive. This pattern of performance was observed in 
science trials only, which may be explained by the inclusion in maths of nine problem-sets 
containing equations, where both true and false trials require a mental calculation, which 
should limit any specific increase in cognitive demand for false trials. It should also be noted 
that a higher proportion of science trials were accompanied by a picture (79% vs. 50%) which 
cannot be ruled out as a source of difference between the two disciplines. 
Overall, these findings support the previous literature that misconceptions due to 
intuitive reasoning exist in this age range [7,54]. Although we used a novel task, which has 
not been extensively validated, the inclusion of problems that cover the curriculum broadly is 
a strength of the study, allowing greater generalisation and relevance for education. 
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Inhibitory control 
The inhibitory control tasks showed a degree of improvement with age, echoing 
findings in the literature [22]. Some measures of inhibitory control were moderately 
correlated with each other, with the highest correlations between RT measures, likely 
representing processing speed [57] rather than inhibition per se. There was a marginal 
negative correlation between the two inhibitory control measures that were selected by the 
regression model: Higher complex response inhibition accuracy was associated with lower 
semantic inhibition RT cost. This suggests that response and semantic inhibition are partially 
related, in keeping with previous literature [26], whereby the ability to make less impulsive 
motor responses is linked to the ability to suppress irrelevant stimuli with less interference. 
 
The role of inhibitory control in counterintuitive science and 
maths reasoning 
Both response and semantic inhibition were associated with science and maths 
misconception performance when controlling for age, general cognitive ability, and control 
performance. In line with our first hypothesis, a smaller difference in RT between 
incongruent and congruent Stroop trials, suggesting less interference and better semantic 
inhibition, was associated with higher accuracy on misconception trials. These results fit with 
the proposal that semantic inhibition may allow suppression of naïve beliefs or irrelevant 
perceptual information in order to reach the correct answer to counterintuitive problems. Note 
that while the Stroop task was selected to measure semantic inhibition, it requires suppression 
of a motor response to some extent [58], so this measure may partly implicate response 
inhibition. Although the amount of variance explained was small, it is still meaningful given 
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that the model included age, general cognitive ability (verbal and non-verbal), and 
performance in related science and maths control trials. The fact that the association is 
observed after inclusion of control trials as a covariate in the analyses is consistent with the 
idea that semantic inhibitory control may play a specific (or more important) role in science 
and maths counterintuitive reasoning rather than science and maths reasoning more broadly.  
The ability to withhold a response in the complex Go/No-Go was associated with 
longer RTs on misconception trials. Therefore, contrary to our hypothesis, good response 
inhibition is not associated with better performance in the science and maths misconceptions 
task. However, a possible interpretation is that good response inhibition may afford more 
time for consideration of the response, with a less impulsive pattern of responding. 
Individuals may not necessarily eventually choose the correct response, but they may be able 
to spend more time thinking about their response and evaluate competing alternative answers. 
The complex Go/No-Go measured inhibitory control within the context of a cognitive 
load. The regression model’s selection of a complex rather than simple Go/No-Go variable 
implicates individual differences in the ability to manage combined response inhibition and 
working memory demands. The use of this ability is exemplified by a maths misconception 
problem that requires counting items and calculating probabilities, and holding this 
information in mind while considering how it applies to the statement. This account is 
consistent with suggestions that beliefs must be held in working memory during reasoning, 
before the incorrect response is inhibited [19]. Future work could measure a purer form of 
working memory in a separate task to assess the extent to which working memory makes a 
unique contribution outside of the context of inhibitory control. 
The discipline-specific analyses had reduced power due to the smaller number of 
trials, in addition to the different number of pictures within the stimuli, so must be interpreted 
cautiously. There were also fewer maths problems than science problems. The results overall 
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suggest that misconceptions in science and maths show similar associations to semantic 
inhibition, with potentially different associations with response inhibition: Higher complex 
No-Go accuracy was associated with shorter responses in science but longer response in 
maths. However, these exploratory analyses did not reach significance so further research 
would be necessary to determine discipline-specific associations. Further distinctions could 
also be made within disciplines. For example, although not focusing on counterintuitive 
reasoning, previous research found an association between numerical dot comparison 
inhibition and procedural maths but not conceptual or factual maths in adolescents [20].  
It is possible that the completion of the inhibitory control tasks before the science and 
maths task may have led to increased inhibitory control use in the latter due to practice 
effects. Nonetheless, short breaks between tasks, which included talking to the researcher, 
may have dissipated any such effects. Further, any effect will have applied to all participants, 
and there remains poorer accuracy in misconception problems compared to control problems.  
Finally, future work should consider the possibility that different types of inhibition 
specifically allow the suppression of different types of misconception. The current study did 
not categorise types of misconception, and contained a mixture of those due to misleading 
perceptual cues, previously held beliefs, and prior experiences. While the focus here was on 
covering a broad set of problems, it would be interesting to establish specific links between 
types of inhibitory control and misconceptions of different origins. Further, intervention 
studies could assess the impact of inhibitory control training in the context of science and 
maths learning. This would help to establish the extent to which the association between 
inhibitory control and counterintuitive reasoning is a causal one; something that the current 
paper could not address directly. The evidence so far suggests that encouraging learners to 
inhibit their immediate responses might lead to improved counterintuitive reasoning in 
science and maths. 
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Conclusions 
The associations seen in this novel study suggest that both response inhibition and 
semantic inhibition play a role in counterintuitive science and maths reasoning problems that 
are curriculum-related. The results are in line with the idea that inhibition is required to 
overcome misleading perceptual cues [45] or old theories that are still present [13,17], and 
that old theories remain present [1,14], rather than being replaced or restructured through 
learning [3,8]. As argued by Houdé [15], this study provides further evidence that poor 
reasoning partly reflects poor inhibitory control as opposed to simply poor logic or 
understanding. The present study focused on curriculum-related science and maths problems 
and adolescence. The results are therefore relevant for secondary education and suggest that 
individual differences in inhibitory control may play a role in science and maths academic 
outcome. 
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S1 Fig. Example Problem-Sets in (a) Science and (b) Maths. 
 
 
 
S2 Fig. Histogram of Mean Accuracy in the 96 Science and Maths Misconception 
Problems. The range of mean accuracy observed suggests that although the mean overall 
Misconception trials accuracy was near chance at 54.7%, participants did not consistently 
guess across all problems. 
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Inhibitory control and counterintuitive science and maths 
reasoning in adolescence: Supporting information (S1) 
Here we present the method and results of the inhibitory control tasks, and further 
accuracy analyses from the science and maths misconceptions task, from the paper 
‘Inhibitory control and counterintuitive science and maths reasoning in adolescence’.  
 
Supplementary methods 
Inhibitory control tasks 
The simple and complex Go/No-Go tasks were computerised measures of response 
inhibition adapted from Watanabe et al. [1]. Familiarisation and practice phases for both tasks 
consisted of ten trials. In the familiarization phase, coloured squares (green squares in the 
simple task; yellow or blue squares in the complex task) appeared on the left or right of the 
screen, and participants pressed the corresponding key, using their index or middle finger, to 
indicate the location of the square. This was repeated until participants made two errors or 
fewer. In the practice phase, No-Go trials, where the response must be withheld, were 
introduced (red squares in the simple task; a blue square following a yellow square in the 
complex task) (Fig 2 in main text). The practice phase was repeated until participants made 
no more than one No-Go error out of three No-Go trials. Test phases followed, and included 
80 trials, with 25% No-Go trials, and a self-timed break half-way through. The square’s 
location and fixation duration were pseudo-randomised so that for every set of ten trials, 50% 
of stimuli appeared on the left, and fixation duration was randomly chosen from a uniform 
distribution between 600 and 800 ms. Responses were not recorded for the first 100 ms after 
stimulus presentation because such a quick response would most likely relate to the previous 
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trial. There were never two No-Go trials in a row. Accuracy and RT were recorded, and the 
two Go/No-Go tasks lasted a total of six min on average. 
The numerical Stroop task, adapted from Khng and Lee [2] provided a computerized 
measure of semantic inhibition (Fig 2 in main text). The aim in this task was to press the key 
corresponding to the number of elements on the screen (between one and four). In the 
familiarization phase, the elements were asterisks. The four number keys were located in the 
centre of the keyboard, labelled with stickers, and participants were instructed to use the 
index and middle fingers of their left and right hands, such that the fingers corresponded to 
numbers one to four from left to right. The familiarization phase was repeated until 
participants responded correctly on 11 out of 12 trials. This conservative threshold ensured 
that mapping between fingers, keys and responses had been achieved. In the first practice 
phase, consisting of 24 trials, the stimuli were single digit numbers, and participants 
continued to respond to the number of elements (digits) shown. These were all congruent 
trials, where the digit matched the number of elements (e.g., “1” or “3 3 3”). The second 
practice phase contained only incongruent trials, where the digit did not match the number of 
elements (e.g., “4 4” or “1 1 1 1”). The second practice contained just two trials, and was 
repeated until participants got both correct. This ensured that participants understood the task 
but did not get too much practice.  
The test phase contained 50% congruent and 50% incongruent trials presented in four 
blocks of 24 trials. The same pseudo-random trial order was used across participants, such 
that each block contained one of each possible incongruent trial and three of each congruent 
trial. There was a self-timed break between each block. Accuracy and RT were recorded, and 
the task took four and a half min on average. This numerical version of the Stroop task 
allowed a more intuitive mapping between numbers and keys as compared to non-ordinal 
stimuli, such as colours, in the traditional colour-word Stroop task. 
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Statistical analysis 
Mean RTs of the inhibitory control tasks are reported for correct trials only. The 
simple and complex Go/No-Go tasks were analysed separately. Three participants were 
excluded from the simple Go/No-Go analysis because of low accuracy (one 12y, one 13y) or 
high RT (one 12y) leaving a final N=87 participants. Two participants were excluded from 
the complex Go/No-Go analysis, because of low accuracy (one 12y) or an inability to pass 
the practice (one 12y) leaving a final N=88 participants. Four participants were excluded 
from the Stroop task because of low accuracy (one 12y, one 13y) or because they were 
unable to perform the task due to a hand injury (one 13y, one 15y) leaving a final N=86 
participants. Two (Trial type: Go, No-Go or congruent, incongruent) x four (Age group: 12y, 
13y, 14y, 15y) mixed model repeated measures ANOVAs were run on accuracy scores in 
each of the three tasks and on RT in the Stroop task. One-way ANOVAs examined the effect 
of Age group (12y, 13y, 14y, 15y) on Go RT in the simple and complex Go/No-Go tasks 
separately.  
 
Supplementary results 
Age results for accuracy in the science and maths misconception task 
There was a main effect of Age group on accuracy, F(3, 83) = 5.61, p = .001, ηp
2
 = 
.169. Follow-up planned comparisons revealed significant differences between 12y and 15y, 
p < .001, 13y and 15y, p = .002, and marginal differences between 14y and 15y, p = .077, 
each of which demonstrated increasing accuracy with age (see Table 2 in main text). 
There was a significant interaction between Discipline and Age group F(3, 83) = 3.68, 
p = .015, ηp
2
 = .117. Follow-up repeated measures ANOVAs performed separately in each 
Discipline showed a significant effect of Age group for science trials F(3, 83) = 4.95, p = 
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.003, ηp
2
 = .152 and maths trials F(3, 83) = 5.15, p = .003, ηp
2
 = .157. Bonferroni-corrected 
post-hoc comparisons (Table A) revealed significant increases in accuracy between 12y and 
15y in science, p = .043, and maths, p = .002, and between 13y and 15y in science, p = .002. 
 
Table A. Accuracy estimated marginal means in science and maths trials by age group. 
 
Accuracy (%) 
 
Science Maths 
Age Group M (SE) M (SE) 
12y 66 (1.8)
a
 65 (1.3)
b
 
13y 64 (1.8)
b
 69 (1.4) 
14y 69 (1.9) 69 (1.4) 
15y 73 (2.0) 72 (1.5) 
a
 p < .05, 
b
 p < .01 in comparison with 15y group. 
 
Inhibitory control tasks 
Mixed repeated measures ANOVAs performed on accuracy in the Go/No-Go tasks revealed a 
main effect of Trial type for both the simple, F(1, 83) = 93.37, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .529, and 
complex tasks, F(1, 84) = 183.31, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .686, with higher accuracy for Go trials than 
No-Go trials (Table 3 in main text). On average, 53% of Go errors were omissions. There 
was a main effect of Age group on accuracy for the simple Go/No-Go task only, F(3, 83) = 
3.16, p = .029, ηp
2
 = .102 (complex p = .725), and planned post-hoc comparisons revealed a 
significant difference between 12y and 15y, p = .029 (other ps < .70).  
Similarly, one-way ANOVAs revealed a marginal effect of Age group on RT in the 
simple task only, F(3, 83) = 2.36, p = .078 (complex p = .530). Planned post-hoc comparisons 
showed a significant difference between 12y and 15y, p = .020, and between 13y and 15y, p 
= .023, but only marginally between 14y and 15y, p = .090. In all cases, RTs were faster in 
the older age group (Table 3 in main text). 
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In the numerical Stroop task, the repeated measures ANOVAs revealed a significant 
main effect of Trial type for both accuracy, F(1, 82) = 224.29, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .732, and RT, 
F(1, 82) = 426.67, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .839, with greater accuracy and faster RTs for congruent 
trials than incongruent trials (Table 3 in main text). There was also a main effect of Age 
group in accuracy, F(3, 82) = 3.58, p = .017, ηp
2
 = .116, but not RT, p = .122. Post-hoc 
comparisons showed significantly poorer accuracy at 12y than 15y only, p = .013 (all other 
p’s > .92) (Table 3 in main text). The interaction between Trial type and Age group was not 
significant (p = .622). 
In summary, No-Go errors (errors of commission) were more common than Go errors 
(errors of omission and side judgement) in both the simple and the complex Go/No-Go tasks. 
Accuracy in the Stroop task was higher and correct responses faster in congruent trials, where 
the number matched the quantity. There were age effects for accuracy and RT on the simple 
Go/No-Go task, and accuracy in the Stroop, with better performance in the oldest age group 
compared to the youngest age groups. 
 
Correlation analyses between tasks 
Correlations between the variables of interest were examined (Table B) to test assumptions 
regarding multicollinearity for the main regression analyses. 
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Table B. Pearson Correlation Coefficients of Regression Variables for Science and Maths Combined. 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Science and maths                 
1. Misconception accuracy                 
2. Misconception RT .04   
             3. Control accuracy .39c .22               
4. Control RT -.01 .89c .05              
Control variables                 
5. Age (months) .38c -.11 .27a -.16 
            6. WASI Vocabulary raw .31b -.04 .51c -.14 .21a 
           7. WASI Matrix Reasoning raw .13 .21a .21 .14 -.02 .15 
          Go/No-Go                 
8. Simple No-Go accuracy .17 -.24a .02 -.18 .21 -.01 -.20 
         9. Complex No-Go accuracy .03 .09 .07 .01 -.04 .09 -.09 .18 
        10. Simple Go accuracy .13 -.14 .14 -.12 .15 .06 .00 .48c .10 
       11. Complex Go accuracy .24a -.04 .12 -.08 .18 .06 .13 .00 -.09 .10 
      12. Simple Go RT -.13 .24a -.24a .35b -.33b -.16 -.22a .11 .07 -.19 -.21a 
     13. Complex Go RT -.04 .22a -.10 .31b -.07 -.15 -.10 .28b .13 .07 -.23a .66c 
    Numerical Stroop                 
14. Accuracy cost .03 -.03 -.04 -.05 -.04 -.12 .06 -.25a -.19 -.03 .13 .28b -.21 
   15. RT cost -.16 .06 -.05 .09 .06 -.09 -.05 .14 -.18 -.05 -.07 .15 .06 -.11 
  16. Congruent accuracy .20 -.10 .23a -.08 .42c .05 -.07 .48c .10 .36c -.01 .11 .24a -.27a -.29b 
 17. Congruent RT -.06 .14 -.14 .22a -.23a -.15 -.13 -.02 -.04 -.23a -.12 .56c .44c -.26a .01 .05 
Statistically significant (two-tailed) correlations are highlighted in bold,
 a,b,c  
indicate p <.05, p < .01 and p < .001 respectively. 
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